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Abstract: This chapter describes and discusses the roles of media tools and technologies in the facilitation of violent 
extremism and terrorism. Rather than focusing on how media report on terrorism, we investigate how extremist and 
terrorist groups and movements themselves have exploited various “traditional” and “new” media tools, from print 
to digital, outlining the significance that they have had on extremists’ ability to mark territory, intimidate some 
audiences, connect with other (sympathetic) audiences, radicalize, and even recruit. Underlined is that violent 
extremists and terrorists of all stripes have, over time, used every means at their disposal to forward their 
communicative goals. Also worth noting is that ‘old’ media tools are not extinct and while ‘new’ media play a 
prominent role in contemporary violent extremism and terrorism, ‘old’ tools—everything from murals to 
magazines—continue to be utilized in tandem with the former. 
 




Alfred Nobel’s invention of dynamite in 1867 was the technological breakthrough that 
ushered in the era of modern terrorism; the economy of means it afforded ensured that terrorist 
bombings proliferated. High levels of illiteracy in nineteenth century Europe imposed serious 
limitations on conventional text-based propaganda. Conversely, ‘propaganda by deed’ could 
show, said the French anarchist Paul Brousse at the time, “the weary and inert masses…that 
which they were unable to read, teach them socialism in practice, make it visible, tangible, 
concrete” (as quoted in Townshend, 2002, p. 55). When the anarchist Albert Parsons was 
arraigned for his alleged involvement in Chicago’s 1886 Haymarket bombing, he proclaimed in 
court that dynamite “made all men equal and therefore free” (as quoted in Townshend, 2002, p. 
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5). However, while terrorist attacks may themselves draw attention and by their target choices 
and other aspects send some kind of message, successful terrorist campaigns must generally also 
employ speech, text, and visuals in order to seek to legitimize, rationalize and, ultimately, 
advertise terrorists’ actions. In other words, as Rapoport (1984) reminded us over 30 years ago: 
“To be noticed is one thing, to be understood is another” (p. 665). ‘The media’ qua the 
traditional mass media has certainly been employed as a tool by terrorists for these purposes 
(e.g., 1972 Munich Olympics attack; 1975 Vienna OPEC siege). That is not what is at issue in 
this chapter however; instead this chapter spotlights the use of media tools directly by terrorists 
and not ‘the media,’ in the guise of journalists, as intermediaries. The focus is therefore on the 
establishment of newspapers, and radio and television stations by violent extremist and terrorist 
organizations rather than press, radio, and television coverage of terrorist attacks. The definition 
of ‘media tools’ utilized in the chapter is wider than these however, encompassing not just ‘old’ 
but also ‘new’ media tools, particularly the Internet, but also incorporating less obvious media 
tools, such as wall murals and photocopying machines. Underlined in the chapter is that in order 
to understand new media trends, we must first examine violent extremist and terrorists’ ‘old’ or 
traditional media forbearers that supply crucial context for contemporary violent extremists and 
terrorists’ online activity including, particularly, the latter’s take-up of any and all ready means 
of communication in whatever era. 
In terms of what constitutes ‘violent extremism,’ we are guided by Berger’s (2018) 
characterization of it as “the belief that an in-group’s success or survival can never be separated 
from the need for violent action against an out-group,” which violence may be characterized by 
the aggressors as “defensive, offensive, or preemptive” (p. 46). Terrorism, on the other hand, 
may be conceived as “violence—or, equally important, the threat of violence—used and directed 
in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim” (Hoffmann, 2006, pp. 2-3). Together, violent 
extremism and terrorism account for a range of political violence activity by a diversity of actors 
subscribing to an array of radical beliefs. The media and communication strategies of two 
particular ideologies are focused on herein: right-wing extremists and violent jihadis—albeit an 
array of others is referred to also (e.g., nationalist-separatists such as the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) and violent Islamists such as Hizbollah). Violent jihadists are inspired by Sunni Islamist-
Salafism and seek to establish an Islamist society governed by their version of Islamic or Sharia 
law imposed by violence (Moghadam, 2008). Right-wing extremists may also subscribe to some 
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radical interpretation of religion, but unlike those inspired by radical Islam, many extreme right 
adherents are not inspired by religious beliefs per se. Instead, what binds these actors is a 
racially, ethnically, and sexually defined nationalism, which is typically framed in terms of white 
power and grounded in xenophobic and exclusionary understandings of the perceived threats 
posed by such groups as non-whites, Jews, Muslims, immigrants, homosexuals, and feminists. 
Here the state is perceived as an illegitimate power serving the interests of all but the white man 
and, as such, right-wing extremists are willing to assume both an offensive and defensive stance 
in the interests of “preserving” their heritage and their “homeland” (Perry & Scrivens, 2016). As 
regards the chapter’s structuring, the sections below are ordered chronologically, treating, in 
turn, early low-tech communication methods or what we term ‘pre-media,’ followed by other 
relatively low-tech tools, such as print and photocopying. The high-tech tools reviewed are film, 
radio, and television, followed by the Internet, especially social media. 
 
Low-Tech Media Tools: Pre-Media 
Over 30 years ago, Rapoport (1984) argued “there can be no politics without publicity” (p. 663). 
Yet prior to the establishment of ‘the media’ and easy access to information technology tools, 
terrorists were restricted in their ability to reach the masses. This did not stop some of the 
world’s earliest terrorists—such as the Shi’a Muslim group that became known as the Assassins 
(1090–1275)—getting their message across: “They did not need mass media to reach interested 
audiences, because their prominent victims were murdered in venerated sites and royal courts, 
usually on holy days when many witnesses would be present” (Rapoport, 1984, p. 665). These 
witnesses would then travel back to their towns and villages, orally spreading news of the 
murderous events to which they had borne witness. Complete non-access to means of 
communication beyond the directly spoken word was and is rare however. Apart from the latter, 
wall paintings—graffiti, murals, or other works of art executed directly on walls—are probably 
the most low-tech communication tools with the capacity to reach a wide audience. 
Although primitive in some respects, historically murals have been a powerful 
communication tool for violent extremist and terrorist groups (Matusitz, 2014), including 
extreme-right (Heschel, 2008), nationalist-separatist (Rolston, 1991), and Islamist movements 
(Marzolph, 2003). Plastered on walls, other large permanent structures, and even on the roofs of 
public buildings, violent extremist and terrorist groups have widely used pieces of artwork or 
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artistic renderings of text for communicative purposes, oftentimes in geographic spaces that are 
home to clashing ethnic or religious groups (Matusitz, 2014). Murals tend to serve at least two 
functions: (1) they act as territorial markers: a terrorist group—or those who support the group or 
cause—will etch out a perimeter, oftentimes in a public space, which they claim control over 
thereby also segregating themselves from “enemy” communities; (2) they act as a form of 
political communication: instrumental communication devices or a “landscape of identity” to 
inform or remind multiple audiences—from the local to the global—about why they should take 
notice of a particular violent extremist or terrorist group or movement (our italics; Matusitz, 
2014, p. 167). 
Murals in support of right-wing terrorist (RWT) groups or ideologies are not only used to 
mark or claim territory, they are used to send a message to a particular group of people that they 
are not welcome. Notable examples include the Nazi terror campaigns in Germany prior to and 
during World War II and the ‘Ku Klux Klan’ (KKK) in the southern regions of the United States 
(U.S.) following the Civil War. To illustrate, in the mid-1930s, the Nazis in Germany used wall 
murals to mark their “turf” on the one hand, and systematically unite and mobilize the Nazi 
movement on the other, oftentimes by painting murals that romanticized their Aryan Jesus as a 
strong, handsome, muscular, blonde, and pure-hearted figure, while simultaneously depicting 
Jews and Jewishness as the root of all evil (Heschel, 2008). One of the most active RWT groups 
in the 20th century U.S. was the KKK, which also communicated messages of intimidation and 
hate through murals. As but one example, in the 1950s, two identical KKK murals, featuring an 
image of a Klansman riding a black horse and holding a burning cross high in the air as the horse 
stood on its hind legs, were painted on the north and south walls of a bank in a city in Tennessee 
(Wilson, 2004). 
Such murals did not become extinct with the shift to mass media. Murals, for example, 
played a role in the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ from the late 1960s. They are still found all over 
Northern Ireland, but are most prevalent in working class areas of Belfast and Derry cities. In 
terms of marking territory, probably the most well-known Northern Ireland mural is located in 
Derry, where the text “You Are Now Entering Free Derry” was first painted on the side of a 
house in the Republican Bogside area of the city in 1969. Both the sentiment and technique was 
emulated by Loyalists who later painted the “You Are Now Entering Loyalist Sandy Row” mural 
in Belfast. In terms of political communication, it is estimated that throughout the period of the 
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‘Troubles’ (1969–1998), some 2,000 murals of varying quality appeared and disappeared. Many 
of these explicitly supported either Irish Republican or Ulster Loyalist terrorist groups, including 
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF); others 
commemorated the perpetrators or victims of terrorist attacks. Not all Northern Irish murals are 
explicitly political and it is increasingly common, following 1998’s Good Friday peace 
agreement, for wall paintings undertaken by school and community groups to be non-political or 
have messages of peace. At the same time, many of the most explicitly hateful and explicit 
murals have been decommissioned. 
Murals are still utilized by some extremist and terrorist groups today. Rather than using 
the term ‘mural(s),’ Johnson (2017) refers to ‘graffiti’ when discussing the Taliban’s wall writing 
activity, which he says “primarily aims to mark territory friendly or sympathetic to the Taliban’s 
cause and objectives, while offensive graffiti (threatening messages) aims at intimidating or 
‘marking’ undecided or pro-government communities” (pp. 102-104). The so-called ‘Islamic 
State’ (IS) has also made extensive use of murals in towns and cities controlled by them. Large 
renderings of their black and white ‘logo’ were painted on walls and rooftops in Mosul, Raqqa, 
Tal Afar, and numerous other locations in Iraq and Syria. In a Blog post discussing IS murals, 
Al-Tamimi (2015) supplies a photo of, for example, an IS mural on a double archway stretching 
over a road showing the IS logo and the text “The Islamic State [Ninawa Province; Locality of 
Tel Afar] Welcomes You”(p. 2). Similar to the Taliban, many IS murals were wholly text-based, 
often featuring quotes from prominent jihadi figures or IS slogans, such as the well-known 
“Remaining and expanding” (Al-Tamimi, 2015, p. 5). The prominence of text-only murals in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria can be explained by the prohibition in Islam on depictions of people 
and animals. Finally, worth mentioning here is that after IS’s loss of their Iraqi ‘capital,’ Mosul, 
in summer 2017, observed was IS murals “being painted over with Iraqi flags, white doves 
bearing olive branches and the hashtag ‘Make it more beautiful’” (Solomon, 2017, p. 1). Having 
said this, the commissioning and de-commissioning of wall paintings—a form of ‘pre-media’—
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Low-Tech Media Tools: Print and Photocopying  
Newspapers, Magazines, and Billboards  
In their seminal contribution to the study of terrorism and media, Violence as Communication 
(1982), Alex Schmid and Janny De Graaf point out that:  
Before technology made possible the amplification and multiplication of speech, the 
maximum number of people that could be reached simultaneously was determined by the 
range of the human voice and was around 20,000 people. In the nineteenth century, 
within one lifetime, the size of an audience was expanded twenty-five to fifty times. In 
1839 the New York Sun published a record 39,000 copies; in 1896, on the occasion of 
President McKinley’s election, two US papers, belonging to Pulitzer and Hearst, for the 
first time printed a million copies. William McKinley paid dearly for this publicity. In 
1901 he was killed by an anarchist, Leon Czolgosz, who explained his deed with the 
words: ‘For a man should not claim so much attention, while others receive none’ (p. 10). 
 
Violent extremists and terrorists of all stripes have exploited the power of the printing press to 
systematically expand their “fan” bases, garner new recruits, and gain support amongst broader 
publics. 
The printing press was certainly an enabler in the Nazi Party’s transformation of 
Germany in the inter-war years into a totalitarian state built on racism, hatred, and fear of the 
‘other’ (Herf, 2006; Koonz, 2003; Welsh, 1993). Newspapers were but one of many print-
propaganda tools, not only to systematically suppress, instill fear in, and terrorize those who 
were perceived as less than the Germanic peoples, but to unite and mobilize the Nazi movement, 
as well as recruit new members. In the 1920s, for example, Hitler and his Nazi Party re-
established a daily propagandistic newspaper, Völkischer Beobachter (‘People’s Observer’) (c. 
1920–1945), which disseminated Nazi ideology targeting, amongst other things, the weaknesses 
of parliamentary government, the national humiliation wrought by the Versailles Treaty, and the 
evils associated with Jews and Bolshevism. At its height in 1929, the newspaper reached over 
26,000 readers daily (Welsh, 1993). 
Print magazines were also a staple Nazi media tool. German Nazis used magazines for an 
array of propaganda purposes during the Third Reich (1933–1945) including, for example, 
providing magazine editors with guidelines about which topics were appropriate for publication 
and alerting a wide audience to guidelines about types of race relations that were and were not 
acceptable (Koonz, 2003). Audience segmentation occurred through the distribution of women’s 
magazines (e.g., NS-Frauen-Warte), which supplied a “better” understanding about what the 
Nazis were doing for women, as well as guidelines about women’s roles in the Nazi state (Rupp, 
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1978). Also worth mentioning here is the bi-weekly magazine Signal (1940–1945), published by 
the unified armed forces of Nazi Germany as a “slick” and “glossy” propaganda tool designed 
for readers in neutral, allied, and occupied countries (Meyer, 1976). Appearing in 30 languages, 
Signal published as many as 25 issues and reached as many as 2.5 million readers in 1943. Its 
contents included an array of relatively high-quality images, alongside detailed information 
about Nazi Germany and its ‘New Order’ as the great benefactor of European people, omitting 
anti-Semitic propaganda (Meyer, 1976). 
In addition, front and center in the Nazi propaganda efforts was an “artistic” yet hateful 
postering campaign, which—similar to wall murals—marked German-occupied territories in the 
1930s and 1940s. Unlike newspapers and magazines, which one generally had to seek out, 
posters were difficult to avoid (Rhodes, 1976). To illustrate, from 1936 to 1943, an estimated 
125,000 posters were placed in public spaces with a high traffic flow of pedestrians (e.g., train 
carriages, buses, station platforms, ticket windows) for the purposes of educating and unifying 
the German people (Herf, 2006). Poster campaigns, which were a blend of political posters, 
leaflets, newspaper editorials, and tabloid journalism, primarily targeted Jews and the allied 
countries of Great Britain, the U.S., and Russia, all while simultaneously depicting the Aryan 
race as superior. The visual effect of these posters was striking, as they contained bold lettering 
and Nazi influenced colors as a means of capturing the attention of those passing by (Herf, 
2006). 
Across the Atlantic in the 1920s, RWT groups in the U.S. were developing their own 
propaganda machine. In 1921, the second wave of the Klan developed their own press after 
facing growing criticism from the public about their “hate-propagating tactics and deeds” 
(Cutlip, 1994, p. 396). The emergence of the U.S. tabloid press at around the same time was 
viewed by the KKK as a key opportunity for them to showcase their Klan identity and, by 
extension, present their radical messages to the public by reframing themselves as more 
“consumable.” As Harcourt (2017) explains: 
[T]he Klan publications that were created are revealing. Klan newspapers were shaped 
by, and reflected, an accommodation to modern press trends – particularly in the 
tabloidization of news. Perhaps the clearest example of the commingling of these cultural 
strands was the collision of the Klan’s anti-modern rhetoric with the puzzle craze that 
gripped the emerging consumerist society. The porous boundaries of cultural division in 
the 1920s were on full display in the popularity of the “Fiery Cross-Word Puzzle” (p. 31). 
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What constituted ‘news’ was changing from traditional broadsheets to tabloid newspapers, and 
RWT groups in the U.S., particularly their public relations teams, took advantage of this 
development by introducing such newspapers as the Searchlight (1921–1924), an Atlanta-based 
publication that promoted “Free Speech: Free Press: White Supremacy” and was the rival of the 
official Klan tabloid The Imperial Night-Hawk (see Cutlip, 1994). 
Magazines were also an important component of the Klan’s media and information 
strategy during this time. Perhaps the most notable output of the Klan’s printing presses was the 
Fellowship Forum (1923–1937). This 12-page weekly, unlike its predecessors, was circulated to 
a national audience, and by 1925 had reached five million regular readers—some of whom were 
international (Harcourt, 2017). Not only did the Forum maintain its readership during a period in 
which the KKK’s official press network began to collapse (i.e., c.1925 onward), but it did so in 
large part because it was developed as a “respectable mainstream weekly” that also tailored itself 
to Klansmen (Harcourt, 2017, p. 49). Throughout the 1950s, newspapers continued to be the 
medium of choice for the U.S. radical right movement more broadly. In 1958, for example, 
prominent U.S. white supremacist Edward Field launched The Thunderbolt (1958), which 
became a leading white power newspaper, succeeded in the late 1980s by The Truth At Last, 
which only ceased publication in 2008 (Southern Poverty Law Centre, 2008). Today, the KKK’s 
official newspaper is The Crusader. 
The Klan also has a long history of billboard advertising. As far back as Christmas 1923, 
the corner of a busy street in Des Moines, Iowa, featured a Klan billboard that read “STOP! 
When you speed you violate the law. Good citizens uphold the law. Knights of the Ku Klux 
Klan.” Comparably, Sims (1996) describes how in the mid-1960s: 
…billboards encouraging motorists to JOIN AND SUPPORT UNITED KLANS OF 
AMERICA INC. became as commonplace as Chamber of Commerce and Rotary Club 
Greetings. Each year the Klan paid five dollars per sign for a state permit to advertise like 
Coca Cola and Philip Morris” (p. 29). 
 
Similar billboards are still observable today in, especially, southern U.S. states. Thomas Robb, 
the ‘National Director’ of the KKK, has, for example, erected billboards throughout the area 
around Harrison, Arkansas, that display messages such as “Diversity is a code for 
#whitegenocide.” Other extreme right groups have followed suit, with the secessionist League of 
the South erecting billboards in Arkansas and Tennessee urging motorists to “#Secede” (Schulte, 
2017). 
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Historically, Islamist movements, too, have utilized ‘old’ forms of mass media to 
disseminate their message widely, recruit new members, and legitimize their cause. The 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood provides a prime example of this propaganda tactic, as they were 
avid users of the printing press from the 1930s. In 1933, the Brotherhood purchased a printing 
press and established a publishing company, thus starting a tireless effort to produce various 
newspapers over the course of the next decade, including launching their own weekly newspaper 
that was available from 1933 to 1938 and again from 1942 to 1946, and that became a daily from 
1946 to 1948 (Ghanim, 1992; Lia, 1998). This print media featured articles that warned its 
readers about Zionism in general and Jews in particular, drawing distinctions between both 
groups, but boycotting Egyptian Jews on the basis that they were allegedly financing Zionist 
groups in Palestine (Lia, 1998; Mitchell, 1993). Funding to support such initiatives was raised by 
creating a joint-stock company, in which only Brotherhood members were allowed to buy shares 
(Lia, 1998). The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood also printed an array of magazines from the late 
1930s to the late 1950s, including the weekly magazines Al-Nazir (1938–1939) and Al-Manar 
(1939–1940) and the monthly magazines Al-Shahab (1947–1948) and Al-Da’wa (1951–1957) 
(Ghanim, 1992). In addition to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbollah, Hamas, and a 
range of other Islamist groups too have long histories of printing and circulating a variety of 
daily, weekly, and monthly newspapers and magazines. Hizbollah’s weekly newspaper, Al-Ahed 
(‘The Pledge’), was launched on June 13th, 1984, for example, and was followed by the weeklies 
Al-Bilad, Al-Wahda, El-Ismailya, and the monthly Al-Sabil (Conway, 2007a). 
In terms of IS’s media strategy, the vast bulk of attention has been paid to their online 
activity. IS also established and circulated a weekly Arabic language newspaper called Al-Naba 
in territory controlled by them from approximately July 2015 however. Al-Naba was also 
available online from December 2015, but as Mahlouly and Winter (2018) recently noted, “its 
primary audience, at least between 2015 and 2018, appears to have been civilians and 
combatants living inside the group’s territories in Syria and Iraq” (p. 14). There are more than 
100 official IS photographs available showing hardcopies of the newspaper being distributed, 
oftentimes prior to its appearance online (see Mahlouly & Winter, 2018, pp. 15-16, for a 
selection of these). As Mahlouly and Winter (2018) further explained: “Al-Naba’s structure and 
form are meticulously consistent: for the most part written in standardized media Arabic, it 
always features a combination of short and long articles with two full-page infographics” (p. 16). 
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Containing photographs, announcements, military updates, and essays, its 139th issue had 
appeared at time of writing (mid-July 2018). Originally 16 pages in length, it was shortened to 12 
pages from the 105th edition. 
Al-Tamimi (2013) describes IS billboarding as a form of da'wah or Islamic religious 
outreach or proselytization and says that those in Raqqa routinely included the text “From your 
brothers in the da’wah office: Raqqa” (p. 5). Unlike its murals, IS billboards often combined text 
and sophisticated imagery. Al-Tamimi (2015) supplies examples of some of these, including one 
showing a fighter jet, a missile, IS fighters, and an IS flag, with accompanying text reading “The 
Messenger of God said: ‘Whoever dies and has not launched a raid/operation or resolved to 
launch an operation, he has died among the division of hypocrisy” (pp. 2-3). Another very 
common subject of IS billboards was instruction on correct womanly behavior and attire. These 
billboards often showed black woman-type shapes and admonishments to wear full niqab. Many 
also featured flowers and other feminine design elements, including utilizing a pastel color 
palette (see Al-Tamimi 2013 and 2015 for examples). On the other hand, in a twist on this theme, 
in 2016 American Muslims in Chicago, Phoenix, St. Louis, and elsewhere funded a series of 
billboards stating, in large black and white lettering, “HEY ISIS. YOU SUCK!!! Life is Sacred 
(Quran 5:32). From: #ActualMuslims” (Norton, 2016). 
 
Photocopying 
Brazilian Leftist Carlos Marighela’s Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerilla (1969) contains a 
section on ‘Armed Propaganda,’ which states:  
…the urban guerrilla must never fail to install a clandestine press, and must be able to 
turn out mimeographed copies using alcohol or electric plates and other duplicating 
apparatus, expropriating what he cannot buy in order to produce small clandestine 
newspapers, pamphlets, flyers and stamps far propaganda and agitation against the 
dictatorship. 
 
The urban guerrilla engaged in clandestine printing facilitates enormously the 
incorporation of large numbers of people into the struggle, by opening a permanent work 
front for those willing to carry on propaganda, even when to do so means to act alone and 
risk their lives (p. 30). 
 
Mimeographs were superseded by photocopiers, so essentially Marighela was advocating for the 
widespread use of photocopying. And, indeed, the latter’s widespread availability from the 
1970s, marked the beginnings of ‘small’ or personal media use for campaigning purposes. 
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Through the simple use of a photocopier, violent extremists and terrorists could mass produce 
posters, stickers, or flyers cheaply and at their convenience. Daniels (2009) points to how the 
extreme-right, amongst other movements, have exploited personal media and information tools 
both prior to and during the Internet era: “social-movement organizations can and do effectively 
engage in activism by relying solely on non-Internet-based forms of communication, such as 
landline telephones and printed materials sent via fax or postal mail” (p. 113). For example, 
David Lane, an American white supremacist leader and member of the terrorist group The Order, 
used an office photocopier in the early 1980s to produce thousands of copies of his first 
pamphlet, ‘The Death of the White Race,’ which was later distributed around Denver 
neighborhoods (Michael, 2009). Similar to ‘pre-media’ therefore, the employment of low-tech 
media tools, such as printing and photo-copying technology, have been in use by violent 
extremist and terrorist outfits from when such technologies first became relatively widely 
available, right up to the present time. 
 
High-Tech Media Tools: Sound and Vision  
Radio 
Radio broadcasting gained remarkable popularity amongst the general public in the Western 
world post-World War I, with the communication strategies of extreme right groups, including 
the Nazis in Germany (Welsh, 1993) and the Klan in the U.S. (Harcourt, 2017) in turn shaped by 
these—in this context—‘new’ technologies. 
When Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in 1933, he saw the radio as an opportunity 
to disseminate his Nazi message to the masses; soon after his speeches and Nazi propaganda 
were being broadcast not only across Germany, but in German-occupied countries and enemy 
states. In fact, Hitler’s speeches were so significant to the Nazi brand that they were widely 
advertised in weekly postering campaigns, and re-printed in book and pamphlet formats. In fear 
that their audience would not tune in, or worse, Germans would tune in to enemy propaganda 
broadcasts, the Nazis took active steps to make radio sets cheap to its citizens, as well as 
broadcast an array of Nazi-leaning programs with non-propaganda elements, including music, 
advice, and tips (Koonz, 2003). Nazi propaganda was expected to be aired on restaurant and pub 
radios across Germany, as well as in the homes of German residents (Bywerk, 2008). 
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The Klan also exploited the communicative power of radio broadcasting in the post-
World War I period. In 1923, for example, the first reported Klansman to contribute to a radio 
broadcast, Imperial Wizard Hiram Evan, addressed “the Klansmen of the Nation” from station 
WOQ in Kansas City, Missouri (Harcourt, 2017). In 1924, ‘Hamilton County Klan’ was reported 
as one of the first Klan programs broadcast from a government licensed radio station. It featured 
lectures by KKK members and “light” entertainment delivered by Klan musicians (Harcourt, 
2017). Klan radio programming became increasingly popular in the U.S. in the 1920s: “a 
smashing hit,” according to one Klan newspaper. The Klan’s Searchlight newspaper also 
regularly published a column aimed at amateur radio enthusiasts (Harcourt, 2017). Klan 
members even managed to form alliances with one of the most powerful broadcasters in the 
Midwest, KFKB of Milford, Kansas. In 1925, the station featured Klan members on a fairly 
regular basis, including KKK lectures and music selections (Harcourt, 2017). But the Klan’s 
most favored broadcasting station was New York City’s WHAP, which three times a week in 
1926 broadcasted anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic sentiment. Klan newspapers and magazines, 
including the Fellowship Forum and Kourier Magazine praised WHAP for being one of the few 
stations to spread their message (Harcourt, 2017). From its establishment in 1926, however, the 
U.S. Federal Radio Commission (FRC) made it increasingly difficult for groups such as the Klan 
to acquire a broadcast licence and transmit material that was both “undesirable and obnoxious to 
[…] religious organizations” and deemed not in the “public interest, convenience or necessity” 
(Harcourt, 2017, p. 151). 
U.S. talk radio’s growth followed decades of deregulation, including the 1987 revocation 
of the Fairness Doctrine, a way by which the Federal Communications Commission attempted to 
regulate content produced by licensed broadcasters. The subsequent rise of conservative talk 
radio had enormous influence and continues to attract millions of listeners daily, well into the 
Internet age. Some stations and programs are no longer simply conservative in their orientation 
however, but fall squarely into the extreme right category. Contemporary extreme right radio’s 
most conspicuous exponent is InfoWar’s Alex Jones. He hosts The Alex Jones Show on the 
Genesis Communications Network, which airs on more than 90 AM and FM stations, and at least 
one shortwave station, across the U.S., and also online. Jones is an infamous conspiracy theorist. 
The aggressively pro-gun Jones is, for example, a Sandy Hook ‘truther.’ He believes, in other 
words, that the slaying of 20 six and seven-year-old children in their elementary school in 
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Connecticut in December 2012 never took place and is an elaborate fake. He has also accused 
the U.S. government of involvement in 1995’s Oklahoma City bombing and the 9/11 attacks. 
Jones started his career in his home town of Austin, Texas with a live, call-in format public-
access cable television show. In 1996, he switched from television to radio, hosting a show 
called The Final Edition on the former KJFK 98.9 FM, also in Austin. In 1999, KJFK-FM fired 
him for refusing to broaden his topics beyond conspiracies and similar. He thus began airing his 
program online from his home. As far back as 2010, the program was reported as attracting some 
two million listeners weekly. While Jones has emerged as the most famous U.S. far right radio 
‘shock jock,’ he is certainly not alone. For example, one of the Knights Club of the KKK-
sponsored billboards in Harrison, Arkansas mentioned earlier, features an image of a young girl, 
the text “It’s not racist to [heart] your people,” and the URL of White Pride Radio. While the 
latter URL currently resolves to altrightv.com, which is no longer reachable, a host of other 
white supremacist radio stations and programs continue to attract listeners. These include Don 
Black’s long-running Stormfront program, which streams online for an hour every weekday, and 
National Vanguard Radio, which focuses on “the anti-White agenda,” “White survival,” and 
similar topics. 
IS’s radio station Al-Bayan or ‘The Dispatch’ was first heard in early 2015. Originally 
airing on an FM frequency in Mosul, Iraq, it was shortly also airing in Raqqa, Syria and, for a 
short time, also in Libya. Described by an Iraqi Joint Operation Command spokesman as “one of 
the strongest” propaganda tools for the militants in Mosul, the Mosul station reportedly went off 
air in early October 2016 after it was bombed by Iraqi government jets (NBC News, 2016). Al-
Bayan had a dedicated website, but which was also subject to frequent disruption. IS sought to 
evade domain takedowns by slightly changing the station’s URL each time it reappeared; once a 
domain such as, for example, albayan.com was deleted by authorities, IS would utilize a different 
but very similar URL, such as by adding an extra character (i.e., albayaan.com), or choose a new 
domain suffix for the site (e.g., ‘.org’). News bulletins were also, at different points in time, 
delivered through Twitter and other social media sites. In addition to Arabic language 
broadcasts, Al-Bayan was known to broadcast in English, French, Russian, with one English 
language news reader described as having “a smooth, male voice with an American accent” 
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(Sharma, 2015, p. 1).1 Following a February 2017 takedown of the station’s website, an updated 
version was reported as appearing online that included “options for high and low bandwidth 
playback and a link to a Firefox browser plugin to enable streamlined playback with the click of 
a button” (Daftari, 2017, p. 1). Earlier, in February 2016, it was reported that AKP files—used to 
install software on Android systems—for an Al-Bayan radio app were circulating on IS-linked 
social media accounts (Tasch, 2016). The station was widely reported as being played loudly 
over speakers in public places, such as markets and the like, in areas controlled by IS (NBC 
News, 2016). 
Film and Television 
The year that witnessed the birth of modern international terrorism, 1968, was the same year in 
which the U.S. launched the first television satellite, heralding the second great revolution in 
mass communications that directly impacted extremism and terrorism (Carruthers, 2000; 
Chaliand, 1985; Hoffman, 2006; Schmid & De Graaf, 1982). In light of these developments, 
worth noting is that while television marked the birth of modern international terrorism in the 
late 1960s, roughly 30 years prior, German Nazis took active steps to make their extremist 
campaign international without the use of television. As early as the 1930s, the Nazi Party 
exploited film to expand their propaganda efforts and reach an international audience. The KKK 
also made efforts in this respect at around the same time, but the Nazis were much more 
successful than the Klan at using film to reach an international audience. Interestingly, no 
extreme right organization has had the wherewithal to establish its own television station. Prior 
to IS, the group with the best-known televisual output was Lebanon’s Hizbollah and their Al-
Manar television station. 
In addition to radio, in the 1930s, film also assisted Hitler’s propaganda to reach an 
international audience (Welsh, 1993). Nazis came to dominate the nascent German film industry, 
which they viewed as a means of influencing German culture, education, and entertainment. 
Their nationalistic films, including ‘Triumph of Will’ (1935), featured footage of German 
soldiers marching to militaristic tunes and speeches from Nazi leaders. They also produced 
“documentaries,” such as ‘The Eternal Jew’ (1940), which portrayed Jewish people as cultural 
hedonists and parasites. German schools were provided motion picture projectors as a means of 
                                                 
1 The voice can be heard on a Quilliam Foundation-produced clip about the station entitled ‘Islamic State’s Al-
Bayan radio station’ and posted to YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OUBbwa0FvPs.  
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providing students with “military education” (Rhodes, 1976). In the U.S., the Klan also saw the 
development of cinematography as an opportunity to inject messages of hate into mainstream 
culture. The movie industry was fast-growing in America in 1915 when the KKK released the 
film ‘The Birth of a Nation,’ which celebrated the original late 19th century Klan (Cutlip, 1994). 
During its height in the 1920s, Klan members developed their own film enterprise, producing 
feature films such as ‘The Toll of Justice’ (1923) and ‘The Traitor Within’ (1924), both of which 
were advertised with poster campaigns as well as screened in churches and schools, and at 
outdoor events (Rice, 2015). 
Following ‘the sanitary decades’ (1940s–1950s) (i.e., a period after World War II in 
which ‘fascism’ was a dirty word), television played a role in propelling the extreme right 
message anew (Hoffman, 2006; Schmid & De Graaf, 1982). During the 1980s, for example, 
television repairman and founder of White Aryan Resistance (WAR), Tom Metzger, developed a 
cable-access television show called ‘Race and Reason,’ which during its height aired in 62 cities 
in 21 U.S. states (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2018). Formatted as a “talk show,” the program 
featured interviews with ‘Aryan’ activists about “white rights” and other race-related issues 
(Simi & Futrell, 2015).2 No group succeeded in actually establishing their own television station 
however. Islamist groups like Hizbollah, on the other hand, were pioneers in developing their 
own stations (Hoffman, 2006). 
Al-Manar, the ‘Beacon’ or ‘Lighthouse,’ in Arabic, has been described as the “jewel in 
Hizbollah’s media crown” (as quoted in Conway, 2007a, p. 402), but labelled a ‘Specially 
Designated Global Terrorist Entity’ by the U.S. government, it was banned by them in December 
2004. Live footage of Hizbollah operations appeared for the first time in 1986, with coverage of 
the invasion of the Israeli-occupied Sujud fort in south Lebanon, and was distributed to those 
Lebanese television stations in operation at that time. According to Hizbollah’s second-in-
command, Naim Qassem, “[f]ollowing the first television broadcast of this operation, the camera 
became an essential element in all resistance operations” (as quoted in Conway 2007, p. 402). 
The establishment of Al-Manar followed shortly thereafter; its first broadcast was Iranian 
revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini’s June 1989 funeral. The Al-Manar satellite station was 
launched in 2000 and is now one of the top-ranked television stations in the Arab world. Al-
                                                 
2 Metzger also made frequent appearances on national talk shows; his son also appeared on the ‘Geraldo’ television 
programme, which left Geraldo Rivera, the show’s host, with a broken nose after an infamous brawl. 
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Manar, however, has been criticized for, among other things, its anti-Semitic content, circulating 
the conspiracy theory that Israel was behind the 9/11 attacks and broadcasting a drama series 
entitled Al-Shattat (‘The Diaspora’), based on the controversial 19th-century Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion, which depicts a Zionist conspiracy to take over the world (Conway, 2007a). 
These and other reasons caused it to be banned from broadcasting in, amongst other jurisdictions, 
France (2005) and the U.S. (2006), but with this being entirely circumventable via Al-Manar’s 
continuous free live online streaming (Conway, 2007a). The latter was, however, just one of the 
innovations ushered in by increased access to the Internet by a wide variety of violent extremist 
and terrorist groups and their supporters from the mid-1990s. 
 
High-Tech Communication Tools: Online Multimedia 
As Ranstorp (2007) put it, “[t]he role of the media as the oxygen of publicity would take on a 
new added meaning, urgency and complexity with globalization and the instruments of 
cyberspace” (pp. 1-2). Illustrated in this section is that while the Internet and the ways in which it 
operates is in some ways quite distinct from ‘older’ media forms, significant overlaps also exist. 
Having said this, the Internet’s increasing ubiquity is causing us to communicate, think and 
ultimately live differently. Indeed, today’s world is interactive in ways that are strikingly new in 
their orders and intensity at all levels (Appadurai, 1996). This has caused some media theorists to 
describe ours as a ‘convergence culture’: “convergence represents a cultural shift, as consumers 
are encouraged to seek out new information and make connections among dispersed media 
content” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 3). Convergence is occurring at the levels of both production and 
distribution; newspapers, television and music once had very different physical productions, but 
can now be produced via a single high-end mobile phone or other handheld devices, such as 
tablets. At the distribution level, previously discrete channels are absorbed into a single-
networked online process, with news, music, and so on, all accessed through the Internet. 
Convergence is also occurring at the level of content with, for example, news and entertainment 
being combined and recombined in new ways. 
Violent extremists and terrorists have been undeniably quick to adopt and use every 
emerging online platform at their disposal, exploiting convergence culture through the use of 
Internet-based media tools. Many journalists and policymakers, however, have only in recent 
years come to an awareness of the use of the Internet by such actors. This “discovery” is, by and 
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large, a result of IS’s announcement of their so-called ‘caliphate’ and their release via the 
Internet of a steady stream of video-taped beheadings of Western hostages and other atrocity 
footage, including mass shootings, stonings, and crucifixions, beginning in summer 2014. IS’s 
violence, including the Internet’s role as its means of dissemination, has attracted significant 
news media attention globally. Journalists, policymakers, and others have come to view IS’s 
Internet activity as a core mechanism of their ‘success’ and that activity has thus taken on 
something of a mythic status. The terrorism-Internet nexus has a much lengthier history than this 
however. 
 
Web 1.0: Bulletin Board Systems, Websites, and Online Forums 
Along with a history of violence, the extreme right has a very long online history, dating to the 
earliest days of the public Internet in the mid-1980s. American white nationalist Louis Beam, an 
early advocate of ‘leaderless resistance,’ established and ran a bulletin board system (BBS) 
known as Aryan Nation Liberty Net accessible from at least 1984 via telephone numbers in the 
U.S. states of Idaho, Texas, and North Carolina. It allowed anybody with a computer and a 
modem to gain ‘dial-up’ access to a variety of hate propaganda and to leave their own hate 
messages. Similarly, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) described in a 1985 report how: 
[T]he Aryan Nations’ network supplies under the heading of “enemies” a listing of the 
addresses and phone numbers of the Anti-Defamation League’s national and regional 
offices. In the same category are listed what the Aryan Nations refers to as “informers” 
for the “Zionist Occupational Government,” its name for the United States government. 
Another group of “enemies” is labeled “race traitors” and is accessible, the network 
claims, only to callers with special clearance. 
Also provided are the names and addresses of so-called patriotic organizations, including 
a variety of neo-Nazi, Klan and armed racist groups such as the Christian Patriots 
Defense League and the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord. The computer 
supplies dates and locations of their meetings (pp. 2-3). 
 
Nor was Beam’s service the only such BBS operating at this time, another U.S.-based service 
known as Info International was established and run by George Dietz, the owner of a notorious 
extreme right publishing company, Liberty Bell Publications (Anti-Defamation League, 1985). 
The Internet first became publicly accessible in 1991, and during this time, Florida-based 
Stormfront proudly described itself as “the first White Nationalist site on the Web” (Oldham, 
1998, p. 1). As early as 1996, Stormfront’s Don Black asserted that “Organizations have 
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recruited through Stormfront, and through their Web pages that we’ve linked to” (Kanaley, 1996, 
p. 1). The original Stormfront was more website than forum, containing a ‘Quote of the Week,’ 
‘Texts Library’ of ‘White Nationalist’ documents, a letters page, an assortment of cartoons, and a 
downloadable graphics section. The ‘Hot Links’ page featured connections to like-minded sites 
such as those maintained by Aryan Nations, William Pierce’s National Alliance, and Posse 
Comitatus. Some of these websites framed themselves as “news” (such as ‘National Vanguard 
News’ and ‘Life Site News’) or “educational” sites (such as ‘DavidDuke.com’ and ‘American 
Renaissance’) (Daniels, 2009), and included links to an array of content and services, from 
“Whites only” dating services to white power music and racist video games (Back, 2002). 
The earliest research into the intersection of explicitly terrorism and the Internet focused 
on the possibility of the emergence of cyberterrorism (i.e., a terrorist attack using or targeting the 
Internet) (e.g., Collin, 1997; Devost et al., 1997; National Research Council, 1991). By the mid-
1990s, however, actually-occurring instances of terrorists’ Internet use began drawing the 
attention of researchers, eventually coalescing around five broad types or categories of such use: 
information provision, financing, networking, recruitment, and information gathering (see 
Conway, 2006). Influence was identified as an important function, but not singled out at this 
stage; radicalization was a concept not yet in wide circulation in terrorism analysis (Awan, 
Hoskins, & O’Loughlin, 2012). In 1998, approximately half of the (then) 30 groups designated 
as ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisations’ under the U.S. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 operated websites, including Hamas, Hizbollah, the Tamil Tigers, and others. These 
groups oftentimes portrayed their radical content as “news,” but with the vast majority of the 
content featuring fierce criticism of Western foreign policy and a focus on violence perpetrated 
by the groups’ adversaries as a means to justify their own use of violence (Seib & Janbek, 2011). 
Other sites run by supporters of terrorist groups (e.g., ‘Kalamullah’ and ‘Islam Web’) were 
disguised as “educational” and included provocative speeches from, for example, Anwar al-
Awlaki, an American Imam who was involved in planning terrorist operations for Al-Qaeda. 
These early websites fulfilled a largely ‘broadcast’ function, with website content tightly 
controlled by the terrorist organizations, and opportunities for interaction negligible. The sites 
nonetheless served as one-stop shops for information on the groups (Conway, 2005). 
By the next decade, online forums had become a popular media and information format, 
especially amongst right-wing extremists and violent jihadis, as forums allowed for much greater 
THE ROLES OF MEDIA TOOLS IN VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM 
19 
levels of interactivity amongst their users (Conway, 2006). The online practices of violent jihadis 
and their supporters, for example, were subject to increased scrutiny by news media, 
policymakers, and researchers following the 9/11 attacks (see, for example, Conway, 2007b; 
Ducol, 2012; Kimmage, 2008; Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007; Seib & Janbek, 2011). This was 
unsurprising given both the events of 9/11 and that violent jihadis significantly grew their online 
presence post-9/11. Dedicated forums were where the global jihad was virtually headquartered 
throughout this period (Hegghammer, 2014; Zelin, 2013). Not only were the forums important 
online discussion spaces, but it was also via the forums that new jihadi online content was first 
advertised and then filtered through to the wider jihadi online community. As late as 2013, Zelin 
predicted “Twitter is unlikely to supplant the forum architecture because it cannot replace the 
sense of authenticity and exclusivity created by the forums” (p. 2). Despite increased 
interactivity, this sense of authenticity and exclusivity was maintained via a significant element 
of control still in evidence on the forums. An example was a conversation on the English-
language Islamic Awakening forum in which a member complained of having been ejected from 
an Al-Qaeda-affiliated forum after commenting on Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)’s killing of Muslims; 
to this another poster responded that the expelled member deserved it, and that the persistence of 
such questions must be dismaying for the mujahidin (Ramsay, 2009). Such controls 
notwithstanding, there were five to eight popular and functioning jihadi online forums active in 
the period 2004 to 2009; by 2013, this had decreased to between three and five. This decrease 
was probably due to a combination of (1) cyberattacks against the forums from the mid-2000s 
degrading their functionality and deterring new members and forums and (2) younger adherents 
shifting to social media platforms (Zelin, 2013, p. 2). 
While jihadi online forums have been eroded by a shift to social media, the extreme right 
are still committed to the use of both general and dedicated online forums. The extreme right 
became increasingly reliant from the mid-1990s on web forums to facilitate movement expansion 
by publicizing messages of hatred and connecting with like-minded individuals, both within and 
beyond domestic borders (Back, 2002; Bowman-Grieve, 2009). A report by the Southern 
Poverty Law Center (SPLC) alleges that in the period 2010–2014, almost 100 murders could be 
attributed to registered Stormfront users (Beirich, 2014, pp. 2-6). One infamous contributor, for 
example, was the Norwegian extreme right terrorist Anders Breivik. According to Stormfront’s 
own statistics, the forum had well over 12.5 million posts at time of writing (August 2018), the 
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“most users ever online” on their forum at any one time was 24,066 at 1.52pm on January 16th, 
2018, and the “total guests” visiting the forum in a 24-hour period in August 2018 hovered 
around 25,000. In addition to dedicated extreme right forums, a diversity of more general online 
platforms or forum-like online spaces also host increasing amounts of extreme right content. 
These include the popular social news aggregation, web content rating, and discussion site 
Reddit and image-based bulletin board and comment site 4chan. 
 
Web 2.0: Digital Video and Social Media  
The shift by violent extremists and terrorists over the course of two decades from an 
overwhelming reliance on websites to a heavy reliance on forums to a wholesale commitment to 
social media has at least as much to do with transformations in the workings of the Internet as in 
the workings of violent extremism and terrorism over the period (Hegghammer, 2014). As we 
have seen, Al-Qaeda had used the Internet for communication and propaganda purposes prior to 
the 9/11 attacks, but their use of the Internet increased exponentially thereafter. This had two 
interrelated causes: (1) the loss of Al-Qaeda’s Afghan base and the consequent dispersal of its 
leaders and fighters; and (2) the rapid development of the Internet itself, the global spread of 
internet cafes, the proliferation of internet-capable computers and other devices, such as mobile 
telephones, and the emergence of so-called ‘Web 2.0’ (Conway, 2012). The latter is 
characterized by its emphasis on the integration of digital video, social networking, and user 
generated content. 
In addition to adopting Web 1.0 and 2.0 technology for violent extremist purposes, the 
performative nature of terrorism meant that violent jihadis, much more so than RWT groups and 
supporters, were eager adopters of digital video (Kimmage, 2008; Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007). 
AQI’s Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was a noteworthy early innovator with respect to the use of digital 
video content. In May 2004, al-Zarqawi had himself filmed personally cutting off the head of 
American hostage Nicholas Berg, and posted the footage online. The purpose of this beheading 
was precisely to videotape it; the images gripped the imaginations of AQI’s allies and enemies 
alike. Al-Qaeda and a diverse range of other jihadis had, for some time, been circulating a range 
of content online, including particularly text-based (e.g., forum postings, magazines/journals, 
books, and written statements) and audio (e.g., statements by leaders, sermons by violent jihadi 
preachers, nashid (chants) products). With the advent of easy digital video composition and fast 
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download, large amounts of violent jihad-supporting video began to be produced, distributed, 
and consumed. 
Early genres of jihadi video included political statements, by leaders and (Western) 
‘spokesmen;’ attack footage; ‘pre-martyrdom’ videos, such as that made of 7/7 bomber 
Mohammed Siddique Khan; instructional videos, of both theological and military-operational 
sorts; memorial videos commemorating persons and/or events; ‘music’ videos; and beheadings. 
These were produced by a variety of official and semi-official media production houses, such as 
Al-Fajr, the Global Islamic Media Front, and As-Sahab. These products were “consistently and 
systematically branded” by the prominent display of graphic logos (Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2008, 
p. 1) and made available in a variety of formats, including those optimized for iPod and cell 
phone viewing. In terms of production volume, between 2002 and 2005 As-Sahab issued a total 
of 45 video products; there was an exponential increase in 2006, which saw the distribution of 58 
productions (Rogan, 2007, p. 91); 2007 too was a banner year, with 97 original productions (Seib 
& Janbek, 2011, p. 32). Both the number of videos and the quality of the content produced by 
Al-Qaeda and associated groups came to be eclipsed by IS’s video output however. 
It has been estimated that IS produced an average of c.46 videos per month in the period 
between January 2015 and July 2016, which amounted to some 140 hours of digital footage 
(Milton, 2016). IS’s digital video content is notable for its high production qualities with, for 
example, one video employing aerial drone camera footage in its opening sequence and the 22-
minute long production showing the burning of Jordanian fighter pilot, Lt. Muath al-Kasasbeh, 
containing complicated animations and scene changes. Many videos contained largely Arabic 
language content, but were subtitled in English and other languages depending on their content 
and the audience(s) at which they were targeted. In terms of the nature of the video content, an 
interesting reversal has taken place over time, with over half of all visual content, including 
video, being non-military in nature in the first quarter of 2015, but only 15% having this non-
martial character in the period January to March 2018 (Milton, 2018). While video content 
comprises only a small percentage of IS’s overall online output, it is worth underlining that video 
content probably also has a much greater viewership and thereby also influence than many other 
types of content (Milton, 2018).3 
                                                 
3 Milton (2018) calculates that it never rose above 20% of even their visual output between 2015 and 2018. 
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Jihadis and their online supporters had increasing recourse to mainstream social media 
platforms from 2011, but with a particularly strong swing in this direction from 2013 (Zelin, 
2013). Like Al-Qaeda before them, IS does not have a single official website; instead their 
‘official’ online content emanates from IS-affiliated content production entities or so-called 
‘media departments.’ At the height of their ‘success’ in c.2015, official IS media departments 
included IS’s central media bureaus (i.e., Al-Furqan, Al-Hayat, etc.) and regional media 
production houses (i.e., Wilayat Homs, Khurasan, Sinai, etc.); semi-official production outlets 
included Amaq News Agency and Furat Media Centre; and a variety of unofficial and IS ‘fan’ 
online outlets.4 These media production outlets produce and circulate not just videos, but a host 
of other types of content, including photo montages, audio, infographics, and magazines. In the 
period 2013 to 2016, this content was largely distributed via major and some minor social media 
and other online platforms. These included prominent IS presences on Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube, but also Ask.fm, JustPaste.it, and the Internet Archive. 
Twitter was a platform particularly favored by IS and their supporters; it was estimated 
that there were between 46,000 and 90,000 pro-IS Twitter accounts active in the period 
September to December 2014 (Berger & Morgan, 2015). In IS’s Twitter ‘Golden Age’ in 2013 
and 2014, a variety of official IS ‘fighter’ and an assortment of other IS ‘fan’ accounts could be 
accessed with relative ease. For the uninitiated user, once one IS-related account was located, the 
automated Twitter recommendations on ‘who to follow’ accurately supplied others. For those ‘in 
the know,’ pro-IS users were easily and quickly identifiable via their choice of carousel and 
avatar images, along with their user handles and screen names. Therefore, if one wished, it was 
quick and easy to become connected to a large number of like-minded Twitter users. If sufficient 
time and effort was invested, it was also relatively straightforward to become a trusted—even 
prominent—member of the IS ‘Twittersphere.’ Not only was there a vibrant overarching pro-IS 
Twitter community in existence at this time, but also a whole series of strong and supportive 
language (e.g., Arabic, English, French, Russian, Turkish) and/or ethnicity-based (e.g., Chechens 
or ‘al-Shishanis’) and other special interest (e.g., females or ‘sisters’) Twitter sub-communities. 
Most of these special interest groups were a mix of: (1) a small number of users actually on the 
ground in Syria; (2) a larger number of users seeking to travel (or with a stated preference to do 
so); and (3) an even larger number of so-called ‘jihobbyists’ with no formal affiliation to any 
                                                 
4 For a graphic representation, see for example Figure 3 and Figure 4 in Milton (2016). 
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jihadist group, but who spent their time lauding fighters, celebrating suicide attackers and other 
‘martyrs’ and networking around and disseminating IS content (Conway et al., 2017). 
External effects, including increased pressure on IS’ territory and manpower and direct 
targeting by Western forces of IS’ social media ‘experts’ and strategists and their cyber 
apparatus, contributed to a decrease in production of IS online content from late 2015. Disruption 
by major social media companies of pro-IS accounts began to bite at about this time also. In a 
February 2016 blog post, titled ‘Combating Violent Extremism,’ Twitter stated that they had 
suspended over 125,000 accounts for threatening or promoting terrorist acts, primarily related to 
IS, since mid-2015. In a follow-up blog post in August, Twitter described suspending an average 
of c.40,000 IS-related accounts per month in the period between mid-February and mid-July 
2016. This ramped up further in 2017, with many pro-IS accounts being suspended within 
minutes of their appearance, such that in 2018, IS’s presence on most major social media 
platforms is a tiny fraction of what it once was. 
While Twitter was once IS’s preferred platform, the Telegram messaging application is 
now its platform of choice. Telegram is as yet a lower profile platform than Twitter—and 
obviously also Facebook—with a smaller user base and higher barriers to entry (e.g., provision 
of a mobile phone number to create an account, time-limited invitations to join channels). These 
are probably positive attributes from the perspective of cutting down on the numbers of users 
exposed to IS’s online content and thereby in a position to be violently radicalized by it. On the 
negative side, this may mean that Telegram’s pro-IS community is more committed than its 
Twitter variant. Also while IS’s reach via Telegram is less than it was via Twitter, the echo 
chamber effect may be greater as the ‘owners’ of Telegram channels and groups have much 
greater control over who joins and contributes to these than on Twitter. Another aspect of 
Telegram that is attractive to extremists is its in-platform content upload and cloud storage 
function(s), which reduces the need for outlinking to other platforms. While Telegram restricts 
users from uploading files larger than 1.5GB—roughly a two-hour movie—it provides seemingly 
unlimited amounts of storage. 
As already mentioned, right-wing extremists have not exploited digital video to the same 
extent as, for example, IS, but they have nonetheless considerably grown their online presence in 
recent years. Right-wing extremist groups and sympathizers have a noticeable presence on all 
major social media platforms, while a new generation of right-wing extremists are also moving 
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to more overtly hateful, yet to some extent more hidden platforms, including 8chan, Voat, Gab, 
and Discord (see Davey & Ebner, 2017). A cursory Google search also reveals that right-wing 
extremist groups, unlike the vast majority of jihadi groups, are able to maintain official websites. 
Davey (2018) chalks up these differences to how social media and technology companies police 
their platforms, in that a much more concerted effort has been placed on removing Islamist 
content than content from the extreme right. Less, however, is known about how right-wing 
extremist groups and supporters are using encrypted communication apps. Some recent reports, 
however, suggest that The Daily Stormer’s Andrew Anglin has taken a page out of IS’s playbook 
by urging his fellow activists to ditch standard online platforms and revert to encryption chat 
services such as Telegram (Holt, 2018). In 2016, National Action also used Telegram to 
communicate with other members of the group about a neo-Nazi stickering campaign they were 
involved in on a university campus (Dearden, 2018), and right-wing extremists in Germany 




Terrorism has always been about communication because, as Schmid and De Graaf (1982) 
remind us, “Without communication there can be no terrorism” (p. 9). The late British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher famously described publicity as the oxygen of terrorism. This 
pronouncement continues to resonate because while it is never their ultimate objective, publicity 
is what sustains effective terrorist campaigns. It follows from this that violent extremists and 
terrorists should take every opportunity to get their message out to as large an audience as 
possible by amplifying their violence via media. What this chapter has shown is that a diversity 
of groups and movements have been quick to adopt and use every emerging media and 
information tool at their disposal, seizing on every opportunity to produce and disseminate 
material and ideas that they desire to resonate with adherents and attract new members. 
Two additional points are worth noting as we conclude this chapter. First, while it is clear 
that the Internet and encrypted platforms have provided violent extremists and terrorists with a 
centralized space to facilitate interactive communications with like-minded individuals on a 
global scale, perhaps less obvious to some is that such actors are still drawing upon a wide range 
of ‘old’ media tools to further their goals, oftentimes combining them with high-tech 
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communication methods—‘good’ examples of this are jihadi online magazines. Second, our 
mapping of media and information tools exploited by a diversity of violent extremist and terrorist 
groups and movements, particularly the extreme right and violent jihadis, shows that they have 
all adopted similar media tactics. What varies between the two movements’ use of media tools 
for violent extremist purposes largely depends on their objectives and the technological, social, 
cultural, and political context in which they reside. With regard to low-tech communication 
methods, one terrorist group, such as the Nazis in Germany, for example, who occupy a territory 
may paint a wall mural on the side of a building in a busy part of town to remind Germans that 
the Nazi Party is in charge and that residents must adhere to their laws. Another terrorist group, 
such as Al-Qaeda in Syria, may display wall murals in a public space immediately following a 
U.S. drone strike, in an effort to drum up local support by reminding residents that the U.S. are 
invading “their” country. Turning to high-tech communication methods, a terrorist group such as 
IS may have no choice but to turn to encrypted platforms to disseminate their content, in fear that 
the material will be removed if it is on the open Web. On the other hand, National Action, a 
RWT group in the U.K., may not have to turn to the Dark Web to spread hatred, but perhaps 
forced to tone down their rhetoric on their Facebook page, for example, in fear that the social 
media company will ban them from the site. In short, both movements have used similar 
communication strategies but at different time periods. 
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